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Is Polyinstantiation Morally Blameworthy?
Mikko T. Siponen
University of Oulu, Department of Information Processing Science, Finland
Mikko.T.Siponen@oulu.fi
polyinstantiation is a well-known research issue in
database/computer security and is morally questionable
due to the lying involved, it has not yet been analysed
from a moral point of view. This might be partly due to
the conventional attitude/moral notion2 of those working
in the field, that security activities are morally good per
se. Also, the blind technocratic view that "the scientist
accepts uncritically the goal A, without questioning it or
without understanding his or her moral responsibility in
producing tools for reaching A" (Niiniluoto, 1993 p. 17)
seems to prevail in the field.

Abstract
In the area of database/computer security the problem
of polyinstantiation is widely recognized. The research on
polyinstantiation can be considered morally questionable,
since it involves lying. This paper analyses whether the
research and practice on the problem of polyinstantiation
is morally blameworthy or praiseworthy in a general
sense. The morality of polyinstantiation shall be critically
analysed from the viewpoint of a moral philosophical
framework. The moral philosophical framework used
includes 1) Kantian ethics, 2) the "impartial" universality
thesis advocated by Hare, Rawls, Gewirth, JewishChristian ethics, and Confucian ethics, 3) utilitarianism,
and 4) Theory of Information Ethics (IE) by Floridi. The
result of this analysis suggests that polyinstantiation is
morally questionable, at least in the light of the chosen
moral philosophical theories. The aim of the paper is not,
however, to deem polyinstantiation as morally wrong
altogether, but to provide researchers and practitioners
with tools and insights for analysing the morality of
polyinstantiation in different cases. Moreover, this paper
sheds new light on the relevance of IE. The results
suggest that, as far as polyinstantiation is concerned,
traditional theories seem to be at least as adequate as IE.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the morality of
polyinstantiation. There may be a few objections to the
moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation that are worth
discussing. Firstly (A), one may claim that the lying is
intuitively seen as morally blameworthy and the issue is
therefore obvious. Secondly (B), it may be claimed that
research is value-free, as is often viewed among the
positivism tradition. Thirdly (C), one may claim that the
issue of lying (irrespective of whether research is
perceived as value-free or not) can be traced back to the
dispute between positivism and anti-positivism - and is
therefore more a philosophical issue about the relevance
of positivism and anti-positivism, which 1) cannot be
settled (making discussion needless), 2) is not a research
issue of the IS community, but philosophers. Fourthly
(D), one may argue that polyinstantiation should be
accepted due to technological determinism, i.e.
"technological change is completely and unique
determined by internal laws independently of human will"
– and all technological possibilities should be realized
(Niiniluoto, 1990 p. 181). Fifthly (E), one may claim that
many security managers do not care at all whether
polyinstantiation is morally wrong or right, and therefore
the morality discussion is useless. We shall next consider
these five objections.

1. Introduction
Information security solutions have an increasing role
in the information age, given that security solutions
technically ensure or deny access to information. This
being the case, the moral scrutiny of security actions
cannot be overlooked - particularly when security
techniques are developed and used to provide false
information. Polyinstantiation – which is a central
research issue in database security (e.g. Lunt, 1991;
Pernul, 1992; Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995; Ellmer et al. 1995;
Gollman, 1999) - is such a solution (developed to provide
false information). It is developed for maintaining
different "realities" or cover stories to different user
groups, and therefore it involves lying to users. In other
words, users who have, say top secret clearences1, are
allowed to see the "true" (top secret) information within
databases, while people who have lower security
clearences (e.g. secret, classified, etc) are only allowed to
see false information. Even though the issue of

A) It may be the case that the notion that lying is
wrong has been inculcated in many of us through
educational systems (as a conventional moral notion),
and/or we may consider the imperative “do not lie” as a
prima facie duty/principle (following the terminology of
Ross (1930) and Hare (1981), respectively). The crucial
question is, however, how do we know whether our
beliefs or conventional moral notions are right? And what
2

The conventional (moral) notion refers to a situation
where a person unquestionably conforms to the standards
of a group or society (Taylor, 1975; Hare 1981).

1

Herein the security level (e.g. top secret, secret,
confidential) of the users.
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The issues of polyinstantiation will be analysed
through ethical theories including Kantian ethics and the
impartial universality thesis advocated by Hare (1963;
1981) and Rawls (1972). As the universality thesis plays a
role in many other ethical theories (from philosophy to
religion-based), an analysis in the light of it may satisfy,
at least in that respect, the requirements of the advocates
of such theories. Moreover, the issues will also be
reflected through the theory of information ethics of
Floridi (1999), which has not been critically analysed as
of now, and utilitarianism. The research method of this
paper is conceptual analysis (Järvinen, 1997). A part of
this paper was presented in Siponen (1999).

are the reasons why such lying may be wrong (or right)?
Therefore, an analysis of such lying from the viewpoint of
ethical theories will hopefully clarify the moral status of
these issues.
B) For the same reasons - given that we want to be
sure of whether research, and particularly research with
respect to polyinstantiation, is value-free – we cannot
avoid the moral scrutiny.
C) We share the view of Hare (1985) that the entry of
the disputes between positivism and anti-positivism in
moral matters is misleading. It is misleading, since the
issue of whether research in polyinstantiation is morally
praiseworthy or blameworthy is not epistemological nor
ontological, but conceptual analytical (see Hare, 1985).
To include the issue of positivism/anti-positivism into a
moral inquiry does not clarify, but rather confuses the
most important question, namely what are ultimately the
right actions. We do not see that the dispute of
positivism/anti-postivism is capable of providing any
explaining justification one way or another, but at worst it
can be used as a pretence to justify actions dogmatically.
When it comes to objection C2 about the relevance of a
moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation, let us recall a widely
agreed view that IS can be divided into three levels:
organizational, conceptual and technical (e.g. Iivari &
Koskela, 1987; Iivari, 1989). The moral scrutiny of
polyinstantiation is relevant to the IS community since it
encompasses the technical, conceptual and organizational
levels. Technical solutions are cases in point with respect
to the technical level (e.g. see Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995;
Gollman, 1999), and the modeling of security aspects
including polyinstantiation (e.g. Pernul, 1992; Ellmer et
al. 1995; Pernul et al. 1998) are examples of a conceptual
level issue. Finally, the issue of whether polyinstantiation
is morally acceptable can be seen at the organizational
level (the guidelines/principles of right/wrong conduct are
examples of organizational level research).

The paper is organized as follows. In the second
section, the framework for the analysis is presented. In
section 2.1, the ethical framework is succinctly
considered and reasoned, and in section 2.2
polyinstantiation will be briefly presented. In the third
section, the morality of polyinstantiation will be analysed.
In the fourth section, certain implications for research and
practice will be discussed. In the fifth section, the key
issues of the paper will be summarised.

2. The framework for the analysis
2.1 On the ethical framework
The selected ethical theories are described below. The
reader may wonder why certain theories such as
intuitionism, cultural relativism and emotivism are left out
of the consideration. The reason is that we consider these
theories as anti-fruitful with respect to moral thinking.
They do not help us in conflicting situations, for example.
Say (case 1) that according to the intuitions of person X
polyinstantiation is acceptable, and according to the
intuitions of person Y it is not acceptable. Similarly (case
2), presume that in the culture of person X
polyinstantiation is acceptable, and in the culture of
person Y it is not acceptable. What can be concluded
from cases 1 and 2? Is polyinstantiation right or wrong?
Which one, X or Y is right? The possible reply that both
X and Y are equally right is not a persuasive answer for
two reasons. First, how can the same action in the same
situation be at the same time right and wrong? Moreover,
the answer that both X and Y are right does not give us
much help when we are considering whether
polyinstantiation is morally right or wrong. It is a matter
for sociology to study what the personal intuitions
(preferences) and cultural preferences are. But such
sociological facts (e.g. what people consider as
right/wrong) do not indicate what is right and wrong, i.e.
how we ought to act.

D) Technological determinism is a naive viewpoint: if
something can be done it does not mean that this thing
should be done (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1990). We can image
several malicious actions that we could do in theory, but it
does not follow that we should do such actions just
because they can be done.
E) The issue should be important for managers, as
well. Firstly, it is widely agreed that humans are moral
beings: we, or most of us, want to do the right thing
(Taylor, 1975; Hare, 1981; Warburton, 1996). Secondly,
employees, public and third parties are likely to hold a
more positive view when organizational activities can
withstand moral scrutiny. And even if the fifth argument
is interpreted as a pragmatic argument - claiming that
some managers may see the discussion on the moral
status of polyinstantiation as vain - it does not follow that
the issue should not therefore be discussed from a moral
point of view.

Emotivism, as advocated by Stevenson (1944), i.e.
stating that our moral concerns are nothing but
expressions of our emotions, is confronted with similar
problems. For example, ethics cannot be purely an
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Floridi argues that different sorts of harmless vandalism
such as a boy stoning abandoned cars (Floridi, 1999 p. 5354) cannot be deemed morally blameworthy by using the
Kantian argument. First, Floridi argues that "its
ends/means maxim is inapplicable" (Floridi, 1999 p. 54).
Secondly, the possible problem of the universality thesis,
if applied to this case, is its possible bias towards
subjective decisions (see below), resulting in that the
mentioned vandalism would be accepted. However,
Floridi seems to have forgotten R1. Namely, it seems to
be clear that Kantian ethics regards this action (the boy
stoning the abandoned cars) as morally wrong due to the
requirement of a sense of duty (R1): its is difficult to
imagine that a boy's sense of duty (in the Kantian sense),
given that the boy is interested in behaving morally right,
includes such stoning of the abandoned cars.

expression of emotions, otherwise ethical discussion
would consists of different sounds, such as grunts, and all
moral argumentation would become difficult (e.g.
Warburton, 1995). Moral values cannot be discussed or
contemplated without reference to emotions, although
emotions per se are inapt justifications for actions.
Table 1. Selected ethical doctrines
Theory/
Principle

Objectives

Weaknesses and objections

Kant

1) sense of
duty; 2)
"impartial"
universality
principle; 3) the
rule of human
dignity;
Maximise
happiness

Partial universality principle

Utilitarianism

Rawls' "Veil
of ignorance"
and Hare's
universalisabil
ity of moral
judgement
IE by Floridi

Universality
principle:
“What if
everybody were
to do that?”
Four moral
laws; Principle
of ontological
equality

Kantian R2 and other Universality theses

Why is happiness the key
issue? Utilitarianism does
not count on the preferences
of individuals.) Leads to
negative utilitarianism
(which leads to absurd
conclusions)
Our decisions are always
subjective.

One weakness of Kantian R2 (act only on
maxims that you want to be universal laws) is its lack of
impartiality. It seems to be possible to formulate maxims
that are not impartial, when impartiality would bring more
equality. For example, the adding of different "epithets"
such as age and status to the maxims to be universalised
(in a Kantian sense) can result in a partiality that can be
difficult to justify. One might form a maxim, say, putting
his/her name or age in it (also presuming that this also
satisfies the first and the last Kantian requirements),
thereby allowing some privileges to people whose age and
name are different from these, for instance. Therefore, to
avoid a weakness of this kind, the universality principle
used hereafter will be formulated in an “impartial”
manner (although no universality thesis is really
impartial) without the aforementioned qualifiers, which
are likely to be irrelevant with respect to the morality of
an action (see Hare, 1989; Kukathas & Pettit, 1990;
Siponen, 2000 for more). So, if we consider whether
action X is allowed or not in the light of the "impartial"
universality principle, we need to ask whether we would
accept that everybody were allowed to do X (in similar
situations).

The claim that one needs to
respect all entities leads to
difficulties.

KANT's R1 and R3
Kantian ethics is a traditional theory, three points
from which will be presented (e.g. Raphael, 1994;
Warburton, 1996). The first is the sense of duty, the
second the principle of universality (i.e. act only on
maxims that you want to be universal laws), and the third
is the rule of human dignity (treat other people always as
an end, never only as a means). These will be referred to
as Kantian requirements R1, R2 and R3. Variations of R2
have been widely used in Jewish-Christian ethics (e.g. the
Golden Rule in the case of Christian ethics), Confucian
ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), and Rawls'
theory of justice (1972), etc.

An interesting objection which seems to apply to
both partial and impartial forms of the universality
principle has been outlined by MacIntyre (1986). He sees
that the universality thesis involves a kind of hubris, given
that an individual universalising a judgement functions
also as a 'universal legislator', and that judgement applies
to all (thus, it is not supererogative, but the action in
question is required). Hence, MacIntyre ponders who has
a right to be such a universal legislator? The idealistic
idea of MacIntyre (1986) has a weakness. Given that all
actions are supererogative, i.e. not necessary, we are in
trouble in practical life. To claim that the avoidance of
killing an innocent person is also supererogative, i.e. the
avoidance of the killing is not compulsory, but "virtuous",
is not a very persuasive claim.

R1 has raised a debate on whether a sense of
duty is relevant as a qualifier of the rightness of an action.
Actions stimulated by a feeling of love are not acceptable,
for example, as love can be blind, and therefore,
according to Kant, confuse rational thinking. In this
respect, Kant's doctrine contradicts some different
doctrines and interpretations of Christian ethics, where
love (agape) plays an important role in determining if an
action qualifies as being morally acceptable (e.g. Hare,
1992a, 1992b; Macquarrie and Childress, 1986 p. 354356). However, by looking at an objection to Kant's ethics
by Floridi (1999), we may see that R1 has its relevance.
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should not be counted? Finally, the use of utilitarianism in
one's ethical conflicts is difficult (see also problems
related to the doctrine of negative utilitarianism, e.g.
Warburton, 1996) . How can one person take into account
everyone’s preferences? It would require a popular
election.

The theory of Information Ethics
The theory of Information Ethics (IE) is a novel
approach by Floridi (1999), that has not been applied
much as of yet, and therefore, the reader should consider
the author’s interpretation of it with a certain amount of
circumspection. A key element of IE is the concept of
information entity. Every existing entity (is a consistent
packet of information and does not contain a contradiction
in itself, etc) in terms of IE, because of being an
infosphere, needs to be respected in a certain sense; one
should let the entities develop in their natural ways. The
latter view is called the ontological equality principle
(Floridi, 1999 p. 44). This ontological equality principle
becomes interesting from the point of view of anti-virus
activity. If a computer virus is regarded as an information
entity in terms of IE, in the light of the ontological
equality principle, viruses (being information entities)
should be let ”develop in a way which is appropriate to its
nature” (Floridi, 1999 p. 44). Thus, if spreading viruses,
for example, is an action which is appropriate to its
nature, the anti-virus activity may be wrong, at least from
this point of view.

2.2 Polyinstantiation
Such conventional requirements of information
security as confidentiality, integrity, and availability in
the area of databases have raised rather interesting
concerns. One of the concerns that will be explored here
is the need for maintaining different concepts of reality
between different classes of users. This requirement
relates to databases which are referred to as being
multilevel secure (here the aim is not to consider whether
they are secure in this way or how successfully they meet
the security requirements). A database system supporting
many levels of clearances such as top secret (TS), secret
(S) and confidential (C) is called a multilevel database
system. One of the simplest reasons for having such a
system is to ensure that users who have a clearance for
seeing secret level information are able to view only that
level, but not information of the top secret level, for
instance. Such a system, if it satisfies the requirement just
mentioned, can be said to be multilevel secure (MLS).
This requirement has been further tightened to maintain
different realities, in other words to support lying. This
problem is technically termed as the problem of
polyinstantiation. A relation can be said to be
polyinstantiated when it has two or more tuples with the
same primary key. The approaches to solving this
problem technically can be categorised as entity or
attribute polyinstantiations (Jajodia & Sandhu, 1995) and
as they both similarly encompass lying, their technical
differences will not be discussed here.

To solve ethical dilemmas, for example, IE
provides four principles (in order of increasing moral
value). Three of them are as follows) I) an action ought
not cause entropy; ii) entropy ought be prevented and III)
entropy ought to be removed (the fourth principle will not
be applied here).
Let consider these principles from the viewpoint
of anti-virus activity. Anti-virus activity seems to violate
the null law, given that the action of deleting viruses
increases entropy (also creation and distribution of viruses
may satisfy the third law). Of course, a malicious
computer virus may also violate the null law. In that case,
one may like to interpret IE in such a way that the amount
of entropy can be calculated. The final moral judgement
would be the action that constitutes the least amount of
entropy: It is likely that the anti-virus activity is the less
harmful action.

Table 1 models an imagined MLS relational
database system where the earlier mentioned
classification of different user level clearances has been
implemented. Let us assume that this example describes a
relation consisting of information about a space shuttle
going towards satellite X for military purposes, and this
real objective can only be viewed by the people who have
top secret (TS) level clearances (Table 1).

Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism holds that under any given
circumstances the action which produces the greatest
amount of happiness on the whole is the right one. This
involves taking into account everyone whose happiness is
affected by the action in question. According to
utilitarianism, we may 1) calculate the happiness of all
beings who are capable of pleasure and pain and whose
feelings are affected by our action; 2) or confine our
concern to human happiness. The weakness of
utilitarianism relates to its incapability of taking into
account individual preferences. Moreover, it does not take
into account the "quality" of preferences, e.g. should we
take the preferences equally into account. Are there
preferences that are "sick" or inherently bad, and therefore

Table 1. An example of polyinstantiation.
Name
Space shuttle TS
Space shuttle S
Space shuttle C

Destination
Satellite X
Satellite X
Satellite Y

Aim
Military
Scientific
Scientific

This example (Table 1) shows the lying
involved, as the user having a confidential level clearance
(C) is mislead to believe certain false information. That is
to say, the confidentiality level users (C) are being
convinced by the owners of the system/TS people that the
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be reasonably justified in that manner, but rather whether
the techniques of polyinstantiation providing lying can be
used for morally good purposes? That would perhaps be
the case when such solutions would be implemented to
prevent a murder of innocent people, for example if a
murderer insinuats him/herself into a system having Clevel of clearances and is lured into a trap due to false
information. It is, however rather difficult to believe that
most of the solutions would be used for those kinds of
purposes. It is at least equally presumable that such a
solution is provided to cover activities that are morally
questionable.

destination of the journey is satellite Y and the objective
is purely scientific.

3. The moral status of polyinstantiation
The question whether polyinstantiation is
morally wrong in general cases and in three particular
cases (A, B, C) will be considered in the light of each
theory.
Polyinstantiation in general cases
Is polyinstantiation is acceptable in general
cases?

Kantian ethics
It is often claimed that Kant holds a rather
absolute view towards lying, as indicated in his doctrine
“on a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives” (Kant,
1949). This raises objections about how a society can
really work if lying is unacceptable in such situations as
Kant describes. However, his view on lying can also be
considered in the light of the division of perfect and
imperfect duties, in which the latter are required only to
some extent, and therefore this latter view, if accepted, is
similar to a prima facie duty (Hill, 1971).

Case A: Lying is to maintain stability
Let's assume (as possible argument A) that lying
with respect to the security of security solutions is done in
order to maintain a human life that avoids disturbance
(whatever its exact amount is), since the expression of
truth would (momentarily) increase the amount of
disturbance or even chaos. This argument is chosen since
it is interesting from the point of view of IE.
Case B: An appeal to private information

Polyinstantiation also seems to violate the
Kantian R3, since such feeding of false information may
not recognize the autonomy of other people. For instance,
a person's autonomy may be violated given that his/her
decision is made on the basis of false information and the
decision would be totally different if the individual were
provided with true information. The result of this is that
polyinstantion would be wrong according to Kant. All the
cases violate Kantian principle of human dignity.

One may try to justify polyinstantiation by
appealing to the presumed right for informational privacy
or ownership of information. For example, one may first
argue that databases consist of private information or
information that is owned by the owner of the systems.
Therefore, one may argue that this private information or
owned information should be under the control of the
owner. Moreover, this control includes that one should
have “the right” to hide (parts of) the owned/private
information (that is “true information, for instance), and
the right to decide what is “the public side” (herein “false
information”). The weakness of this argument is that it is
not obvious that the owners of the systems (e.g. an
organization) really own all the information – and even if
their do own it, it does not follow that the owners have so
full a control over it that it includes manipulation of
information.

The universality thesis
According to Kant, a society cannot be based on
a situation where lying is accepted (Kant, 1974 p. 444),
and commonly speaking, perhaps many of us would end
up with a similar belief after application of the
universality principle: “but what if everyone lied?” Thus,
the aforementioned view (the Kantian universality
principle) would likely regard lying as wrong in a general
sense. This would perhaps also apply to lying related to
polyinstantiation in a general sense.

Even though we might appreciate private
information - everything has its limits – if not ethical
dilemmas with respect to privacy would not exists. For
this reason, e.g. to see whether one’s privacy claims are
justified, we need ethical theories.

Claims A is not likely to survive from the point
of view of the (impartial) universality thesis: "do you
prefer a society where such a activity would be
accepted?"). Even though in case A, if telling the truth
would instantly increase disorder (let us assume so), we
assume that many of us would still choose to tell the
‘truth’ (as it would be a better option even with small
momentary increases of disorder than a situation based on
lying).

Case C: It can be used for good purposes
An often used justification of scientific basic
research is to claim that the techniques being developed,
even those associated with weapons research, can also be
used for morally good purposes. Therefore, the
development per se, one can argue, is an amoral matter,
but its application or further use is not. The aim of this
paper is not to consider whether bombs, for instance, can

Claim B is also questionable from viewpoint of
the universality thesis. That is to say, the impartial
universality thesis may not support such an activity
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("what if everybody were acting in that way?") The third
case (C) may be acceptable in the light of the universality
thesis provided that we would consider polyinstantiation
as a necessary activity in order to avoid some activity that
we consider more unwanted (e.g. killing in our example).

4. Implications for research and practice
Based on the moral scrutiny of polyinstantiation,
we shall formulate a practical guidance for practitioners
and researchers.
- Consider whether the polyinstantiation/lying
can be avoided? Is lying necessary?

Agape
Moreover, Christian thinkers may avoid
polyinstantiation in all the cases since it is difficult to see
as an expression of love (agape). It is difficult to see that
lying in a general sense could be carried out to express
love. One may argue that the third case (C) makes an
exception. Given that polyinstantiation is necessary for
stopping more unwanted activities (that are very antiloving activities), it can be claimed that polyinstantiation
would be acceptable in such a situation.

- Consider in which situations polyinstantiation
is used. Consider whether it is acceptable is such
situations with the help of ethical theories. For example,
when applying the universality principle, you need to
consider the situation and ask: Would you like it if people
acted towards you in a similar manner, i.e. would you
prefer that people in similar situations lied/provided false
information to you?

Utilitarianism

5. Conclusions

Whether polyinstantiation is wrong from the utilitarian
point of view, can be ascertained by counting the
preferences of all people. Lying in a general sense may
also not increase our happiness, but if acting honestly
maximizes happiness, lying would be morally wrong from
the utilitarian viewpoint. For example, If A were the
prevailing state of affairs, and further, assuming that
disorder due to 'truth' implies unhappiness, the utilitarian
view would allow lying. If, on the other hand, truth
increased pleasure, the truth should be revealed.

Technical research and "design research" is generally
quite applied by nature, resulting in that moral scrutiny
cannot be avoided (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1993).
Polyinstantiation is an action that is indeed relevant to
consider from the moral point of view. Lying with respect
to polyinstantiation was analysed in the light of different
ethical theories. It is argued that the activity is morally
questionable, at least in light of the used moral
philosophical framework. None of the theories gave
support for maintaining polyinstantiation in a general
sense. Lying violates the Kantian rules of human dignity.
IE advocates that information should be true, and most of
us would not want that everyone in a similar situation
would provide us false information (universality
principle). Of our cases, the third case (C) was the only
one that may be acceptable for polyinstantiation.
Assuming that polyinstantiation is necessary for avoiding
more negative activities than polyinstantiation, it may be
that it is acceptable. It is concluded that the traditional
ethical theories (other theories used excluding IE) seem to
be as adequate as IE - as far as polyinstantiation is
concerned.

IE
If, in that case (example A), one applied IE, then
lying might be at first sight morally more favorable than
telling the truth, given that lying does not increase entropy
(consider the null/I law of IE), but it may also prevent
entropy and telling the truth, considering example A,
increases entropy. In above it was presumed that lying
does not increase entropy at all. If the lying does cause
some amount of entropy, however, it may not change the
result under consideration, given that telling the truth
would increase entropy more than lying. Although in that
case both actions may not be morally good (given that
they both increase entropy), one should perhaps perform
the action (provided that these are the only possibilities)
which is perceived better based on the level of entropy.
Of course, it's not clear that telling the truth (in situations
such as A) would increase entropy at all. The applier of
IE, however, might consider lying as morally wrong in
case A in the respect that correctability (which is one of
the constructionist information properties of the
infosphere) is a feature of the infosphere that should to be
respected. It therefore seems that according to IE we
should respect the correctness of information, which lying
is most likely not to do. When it comes to the other cases
(B, C), the amount of entropy would be the final factor
deciding whether polyinstantiation would be morally
acceptable in these situations.

We hope that this analysis has shed new light to
practitioners as well as researchers, and therefore provides
valuable information on the value of the research on
polyinstantiation.
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